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Do Not Focus Only on Salary: Points to Consider Before Signing a Physician Employment Contract

By: James D. Wall, Esq.

Physicians often myopically rely on starting salary as the sole criterion for deciding which prospective employer has the better offer.  However, draconian provisions in an employment contract can make the newly employed physician long for the “good ole days” when he or she was a resident.  Here are some points a physician should consider before entering into an employment contract.

Termination Clauses

Almost all contracts (regardless of term) allow the employer to terminate the physician “without cause” upon prior written notice, which typically ranges from 60 to 180 days.  “Without cause” means the employer needs no reason (or “cause”) for the termination.  A physician can minimize the adverse impact of this type of termination by requiring the employer to waive the non-compete or pay for physician’s tail coverage (more on these below) if the employer terminates without cause.  Further, while without cause termination provisions are prevalent, they are also almost always reciprocal, thus allowing the physician the right to terminate without cause with the same notice as the employer.

Call

It is important for the physician to understand his or her call obligations at the outset.  The physician should understand how many physicians are in the call pool and whether the physician provides a certain service that will make it difficult for others in physician’s specialty to take call for physician.  If the contract requires active privileges at neighboring hospitals, what do the hospitals’ bylaws require regarding unattached call?  Often, bigger practices are loathe to mention a specific amount of call in the agreement because they have robust and time-tested call policies and need flexibility if someone in the call pool leaves.  Nonetheless, even if an employer is unwilling to address call in its agreement, it is important for the physician to have a full understanding of call.  

Type of Work

It is sometimes difficult to get an employer to put in writing exactly what type of work a physician will be performing.  However, for certain specialists, it is extremely important to find out what type of work he or she will be doing.  This is especially true if the physician must do a certain number of procedures in order to obtain board certification.  

Compensation

A popular method of compensating physicians is to provide a guarantee for one to three years and then pay the physician based on work relative value unit (often abbreviated “wRVU”).  Sometimes, the guarantee is a floor, and the physician gets a bonus if he or she exceeds wRVU expectations.  Payment on wRVUs requires the employer to accept the risks of collection.   A physician may want to use outside resources (like MGMA) to determine if the amount of compensation per wRVU and the minimum number of wRVUs for the year are reasonable.  After the guarantee period expires, a physician may be at risk if he or she is paid more in salary than earned in wRVUs, which could trigger a repayment obligation.

Partnership Potential

Many independent practices are being purchased by hospitals, management service organizations and bigger practices, often resulting in one-time lucrative payouts to the practices’ owners.  If a physician is in an arrangement where he or she has a long partnership track, and the practice is sold the day before he or she becomes a partner, then the physician will receive nothing for his or her sweat equity in the practice.

Non-compete Covenants

Non-compete clauses are unenforceable in some states, and the Federal Trade Commission has recently proposed rules that would make non-competes unenforceable in all states.    Even in states where non-compete covenants are enforceable, physicians can challenge the covenants for being unreasonable or against public policy.  Nonetheless, prior to signing a contract, a physician should assume that the covenant is enforceable as written.   This means it is important to limit the temporal and geographic scope, and to attempt to require the employer to waive the non-compete in certain circumstances, such as the employer’s termination of the physician without cause.     

Cover Your “Tail”

Many employers provide “claims-made” malpractice coverage for their employed physicians.  If the physician’s employment terminates, the physician’s coverage is also terminated.  Generally, if a claim is made during the term of the employee’s employment, there is coverage.  However, if a claim is made after the employee has left the employer, then the former employee would not be covered.

This gap can be insured by the employee’s purchase of what is known in the insurance industry as a “tail.” The tail covers for acts or omissions occurring prior to his or her termination, but for which the claim is made after termination of employment.  The tail could be costly, often twice the amount of the annual premium.  Some bigger health systems have an occurrence policy which obviates the need for tail.  However, if the employer has a claims-made policy, the physician should consider whether to push the cost of the tail to the employer under certain circumstances.  

Conclusion

Often, contracts that look very generous because of starting salary might not be as generous when the physician considers other factors.

Article published in the North Carolina Psychiatric Association March 2024 Newsletter.

LTL II and Imerys: Balloting and Solicitation in Mass Tort Cases

By: Jennifer B. Lyday and Cassidy L. Willard

Just hours after LTL’s first bankruptcy case was dismissed on April 4, 2023, LTL filed a second petition (hereinafter, “LTL II”). LTL asserted that it had the support of “[more than] 60,000 claimants who have signed and delivered plan-support agreements,” despite the fact that the debtor had not revealed such high-claim volumes in its dismissed bankruptcy case.2

The official committee of talc claimants argued that “LTL had no commitments from claimants, only commitments from attorneys representing those clients to recommend that their client support [ed] the proposed agreement.”3 To say the least, no consensus existed in the early days of LTL II as to the legitimacy of the debtor’s assertions of broad tort claimant support for its proposed reorganization plan.

As every chapter 11 practitioner knows, support for a reorganization plan is central to the confirmation process in a chapter 11 case. The Bankruptcy Code, in combination with case law and legislative history, provides some guidance for balloting and solicitation in chapter 11 cases, although these standards are very amorphous and seem to be evolving in mass tort bankruptcy cases. In addition, unlike in standard chapter 11 cases, the nature and magnitude of mass tort claims in mass tort bankruptcy cases cause further challenges in the voting process.

These issues are only amplified in mass tort bankruptcy cases dealing with asbestos liability. Section 524 (g) of the Bankruptcy Code requires a plan to be approved by at least 75 percent of voting claimants if a channeling injunction is to be issued in an asbestos mass tort bankruptcy case — a higher percentage of acceptance than would be required in a typical chapter 11 case.

Although the focus of the practitioners in LTL II quickly shifted from the legitimacy and significance of the alleged 60,000 claims to the motion to dismiss filed by the official committee of talc claimants, which ultimately led to the bankruptcy court dismissing LTL II only four months after it was filed, the early days of the case illuminated important questions about balloting and solicitation in mass tort bankruptcy cases.

If LTL II had moved forward, questions about who could vote on the proposed plan, the value of each claim during voting and the mechanics of the voting process would have been raised. The bankruptcy court was able to sidestep these issues in LTL II, but bankruptcy courts will undoubtedly be forced to tackle the questions discussed in this article in future mass tort bankruptcy cases, and the answers are far from obvious, making the outcome of contentious plan-confirmation litigation in asbestos bankruptcy cases uncertain at best.

Who Is Entitled to Vote on the Reorganization Plan?

This was the first question raised by LTL II. Determining who can vote in a typical chapter 11 case is a straightforward process. Section 1126 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that only “allowed” claims or interest-holders may accept or reject a plan.4 A claim is allowed if a party files a proof of claim before the bar date without an objection from a party-in-interest.5 However, the question of who can vote on a reorganization plan in a mass tort bankruptcy case is more challenging when the debtor, like the debtor in LTL II, does not request that the court set a bar date.6

Without a bar date or proof-of-claim process to determine whether a claim is substantiated, the door is left open for any purported claimant that fits the description listed in a proposed plan being entitled to vote. When proofs of claim are not filed, there is no process for corroborating or verifying the alleged exposure of the voting claimants or their subsequent injury. In LTL II, the proposed plan included “Class 4 — Talc Personal Injury Claims,” which consisted of all talc personal-injury claims.7 The plan further defined “Talc Personal-Injury Claims” as any claim or Talc Personal-Injury Demand against the Debtor, Old JJCI, or any other Protected Party, whether known or unknown, including with respect to any manner of alleged bodily injury, death, sickness, disease, emotional distress, fear of cancer, medical monitoring, or any other alleged personal injuries (whether physical, emotional, or otherwise), directly or indirectly arising out of or in any way relating to the presence of or exposure to talc or talccontaining products.8

Accordingly, any person who alleged that they had a claim as defined above would have theoretically been entitled to vote on the plan, although many tort claimants would have certainly objected to such an open, unstructured voting process for fear that the voting power of their legitimate claims would be diluted. By broadening the claimant pool, a debtor can dilute the voting power of tort claimants with substantiated claims, increasing its chance of obtaining enough support to clear the § 524 (g) threshold. It is unclear how Judge Kaplan would have dealt with these issues.

However, the problem of determining who can vote on a proposed plan in a mass tort bankruptcy case is not unique to LTL II, nor is the all-encompassing language in the LTL II plan unique. A similar problem caused by a comparable plan and case structure existed in Imerys Talc America Inc., another mass tort case in which the debtor did not seek a bar date for tort claimants.9 What was different about Imerys was that the plan-confirmation process was allowed to play out longer than it did in LTL II. The outcome of that process demonstrates how important it is for the bankruptcy court to provide some sort of gatekeeping function with respect to plan votes in mass tort bankruptcy cases.

In Imerys, a law firm submitted a master ballot representing 15,719 claimants with no due diligence or regard for whether any of the claimants had the injury required to vote on the plan.10 According to the court, the law firm did not even attempt to discern whether any claimant was exposed to talc.11

In LTL II, the official committee of talc claimants warned of a similar situation and argued that the debtor was inflating the voting rolls “by including unfiled, unsubstantiated claims that would ultimately recover no (or only nominal) compensation” to broaden the claimant pool.12 Without a process for corroborating or verifying the alleged exposure of the voting claimants, claimants who would not have had a claim in the tort system would be allowed to influence whether a reorganization plan is approved, causing an unjust result. However, an exact process to be implemented that would both ensure a fair voting process and be efficient enough in cases with thousands of potential claims has not yet been perfected.

How Is Each Claim Valued for Voting Purposes?

As posed in this second question raised by LTL II, voting to confirm a plan occurs before an individual’s tort claim has been liquidated. Thus, courts typically have very little information
about the individual’s tort claim during the voting process. The order of this process raises questions about the appropriate voting valuation for each tort claimant. Should specific voting amounts be assigned on an individualized basis, or should all claimants have their claim valued at $1
for voting purposes? Should courts prioritize the efficiency of valuing all claims at $1, or try to adequately assign values that reflect the individual claimant’s injury? These questions highlight a larger tension in mass tort bankruptcies between efficiency and adequate representation.

In asbestos cases, two methods have emerged to value tort claims for voting purposes. The first claim-valuation method values every claim at $1 solely for voting purposes.13 Opponents of this method argue that it nullifies claimants that have claims of greater magnitude by treating each tort claimant the exact same regardless of their alleged injury.

For example, in Johns-Manville Corp., the court used this method of valuation — estimating each asbestos claim at $1 — and one of the creditors challenged the procedure, alleging that the voting valuation violated his rights under the Bankruptcy Code.14 The creditor argued that by valuing each claim at $1, the court “failed to adhere to the Code’s voting scheme whereby a minority of class members with just over one third of the value of the total claims may reject a plan.”15 The court rejected the argument, holding that “the alleged irregularities were at most harmless error.”16 Nevertheless, the Quigley Co. court warned that if a different voting method would change the result, “the alternative is to weigh each vote based on [the] nature and impairment of each claimant’s injury.”17

The second claim-valuation method assigns a dollar amount based on the disease category of the claimant’s alleged injury. At the time of voting, the claimant indicates what type of disease is alleged, and the disease corresponds to a specific value.

The Quigley Co. court explained that “[t] his method more accurately aligns the voting strength with the ultimate claim value … and prevents the holders of relatively small claims from disenfranchising the more severely impaired who hold larger claims.”18 Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether courts should spend the time and resources adequately assigning values that reflect the individual claimant’s injury, to the extent that it is possible, or prioritize the efficiency of valuing all claims at $1.

Should Master Ballots Be Allowed?

Regarding the third question raised by LTL II, due to the large volume of claimants the use of master ballots has become commonplace in mass tort bankruptcy cases, with law firms submitting a master ballot containing the votes of all the claimants it represents. The drawback of master ballots
was recently illuminated in Imerys Talc America Inc., when the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware eliminated 15,719 votes on a proposed plan because a law firm submitted a master ballot without asking any individual claimant how they wanted to vote on the plan.19

Instead, the firm relied on a one-page “attorney agreement” that granted the law firm the authority to vote on behalf of all claimants.20 In voting, the law firm did not consider each claimant individually, but instead treated all claimants together in voting to either reject or accept the plan in its entirety.21 In response, the court withdrew the master ballot and cautioned the plaintiffs’ bar:

It is counsel’s job to make the plan understandable and (if counsel is not empowered to vote for the client) to provide advice on whether to accept or reject the plan. This is the second time this year in a mass tort case that counsel has suggested that these types of cases are too complicated for individuals to comprehend. To paraphrase my previous response:
“I don’t buy it.”22

Further, in Combustion Engineering, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals elaborated, stating that “[w]here the voting process is managed almost entirely by proxy, it is reasonable to require a valid power of attorney for each ballot to ensure claimants are properly informed about the plan and that their votes are valid.”23 Therefore, while courts may continue to permit master ballots, the question remains: What safeguards are necessary to ensure that the use of master ballots prioritizes and protects the rights of individual claimants?

Conclusion

The permissibility of nonconsensual nondebtor releases is not the only controversial issue that practitioners face in mass tort bankruptcy cases. Who can vote on a proposed plan, the value of each claim for voting purposes, and the specific mechanics of the voting process must be determined in every mass tort bankruptcy case. When the parties do not agree on the answers to these questions, uncertainty reigns. The unpredictability surrounding contentious plan-confirmation litigation should serve as a reminder to chapter 11 practitioners of the importance of prioritizing settlement and good-faith negotiations throughout the chapter 11 process.

1 Transcript of Hearing on Motion by Movant Anthony Hernandez Valadez at 102, In re LTL Mgmt. LLC, No. 23-12825 (Bankr. D.N.J. April 11, 2023).
2 Public Petition for Writ of Mandamus of Official Committee of Talc Claimants and Appendix Volume 1 of 11 (pp. A1-A66) at 12, In re Official Comm. of Talc Claimants, No. 23-12825 (Bankr. D.N.J. May 1, 2023).
3 Id.
4 11 U.S.C. § 1126.
5 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-502.
6 For example, in In re Imerys Talc Am. Inc., the debtor did not request a bar date, which led to votes being eliminated because there was no process for disposing of non-meritorious claims prior to voting. Case No. 19-10289, 2021 WL 4786093, *11 n.93 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 13, 2021). Conversely, the debtors in recent mass tort bankruptcy cases that have reached a settlement requested that the court set a bar date. See In re Boy Scouts of Am. and Delaware BSA LLC, 642 B.R. 504, 533 (Bankr. D. Del. 2022), supplemented, No. 20-10343 (LSS), 2022 WL 20541782 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 8, 2022), aff’d, 650 B.R. 87 (D. Del. 2023), aff’d, 650 B.R. 87 (D. Del. 2023); see also In re Purdue Pharma LP, 2023 WL 5950707, *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2023).
7 Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of LTL Management LLC at 26, In re LTL Mgmt. LLC, No. 3:23-bk-12825 (Bankr. D.N.J. May 15, 2023).
8 Id. at 17-18.
9 Many of the proposed plans filed in Imerys Talc America Inc. defined a class of talc personal-injury claimants the same way as the plan filed in LTL II. In re Imerys Talc Am. Inc., Case No. 19-10289, 2021 WL 4786093 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 13, 2021).
10 Id. at *9.
11 Id.
12 Public Petition for Writ of Mandamus of Official Committee of Talc Claimants and Appendix Volume 1 of 11 (pp. A1-A66) at 12-13, In re Official Comm. of Talc Claimants, No. 23-12825 (Bankr. D.N.J. May 1, 2023).
13 See Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 641, 647-48 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Lloyd E. Mitchell Inc., 373 B.R. 416, 427-28 (Bankr. D. Md. 2007); In re Quigley Co., 346 B.R. 647, 654 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Imerys, 2021 WL 4786093, at *11 (approving solicitation procedures, at debtors’ request and without objection by any party-in-interest, that allowed unliquidated and disputed “Direct Talc Personal Injury Claims” at $1 for voting purposes).
14 Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 641 (2d Cir. 1988).
15 Id. at 646.
16 Id. at 648.
17 In re Quigley Co., 346 B.R. 647, 654 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
18 Id. at 654.
19 In re Imerys Talc Am. Inc., 2021 WL 4786093 at *9.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at *12.
23 In re Combustion Eng’g Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 245 n.66 (3d Cir. 2004).

Problems in the Code: Oversight Results in Uncertainty for Small Business Owners Converting to Subchapter V.

By: Jennifer B. Lyday and Josh Plummer

In February 2020, Congress codified the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (SBRA) as subchapter V of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.1 In doing so, Congress established a relative safe haven for eligible small businesses that provides a more streamlined and less costly chapter 11 relief process.2

However, in its haste to “permit qualifying small business debtors to file [for] bankruptcy in a timely, cost-effective manner,”3 Congress seemingly failed to amend § 348 (b) — a critical Code section that grants timeline extensions in most instances when cases are converted from one chapter to another.4 As a result, many small businesses converting their cases to subchapter V quickly find themselves mired in a purgatory of rapidly expiring deadlines and additional litigation, with no consensus on a solution.5 Whether Congress’s omission regarding § 348 (b) is by oversight or intent,6 the recommended solution remains the same: Congress must amend § 348 (b) to allow for extensions in subchapter V conversion cases, as they already do with other chapter 11 conversions, to provide judicial clarity and meet the SBRA’s intent.

Section 348

Section 348 provides clarity regarding the “effects of conversion” on a debtor’s case. Debtors often convert their bankruptcy cases to different chapters of the Bankruptcy Code for various reasons, including unforeseen ineligibility under the original chapter filing or changed circumstances.7 However, while converting a case to another chapter may be necessary or beneficial to the debtor, conversions present several new complexities. For example, conversions often result in shifting rules regarding the property that makes up the estate, and the passage of time prior to the conversion frequently conflicts with filing deadlines under the new chapter. Section 348 anticipates these issues and provides statutory remedies for most of them.

Section 348 (f) (1) (A) clarifies what property makes up the estate in cases converted from chapter 13 to another chapter.8 In addition, § 348 (b) addresses expired — or rapidly expiring — filing deadlines under enumerated sections that arise when debtors convert to a new chapter.9 For example, § 1121 (b) provides that under a chapter 11 case, “only the debtor may file a plan until 120 days after the date of the order for relief under this chapter” to file a plan.10 After a debtor converts their case to chapter 11, confusion is likely to ensue over when the 120-day deadline to file a new plan began. Was it the date that the order for relief under the original chapter was granted, or the date of conversion? If the former, this could be particularly stressful for a debtor when a substantial amount of time has passed since the original filing, and a filing deadline under the new chapter is either looming or lapsed.

Luckily, § 348 (b) provides a cogent solution to this common issue. To resolve the possible ambiguity, § 348 (b) provides that in cases that have been converted under §§ 706, 1112, 1208 or 1307, “the order for relief under this chapter” in § 1112 (b) — and 12 other enumerated sections of chapters 7, 11, 12 and 13 — “means the conversion of such case to such chapter.”11 Thus, in effect, § 348 (b) grants automatic extensions to debtors under these enumerated sections by “resetting the clock” for filing deadlines to the date of conversion.

The Omission

Unfortunately, when Congress codified the SBRA, it did not amend § 348 (b) to incorporate the sections of subchapter V containing deadlines.12 For example, § 1189, which provides for a 90-day deadline for debtors to file a plan under subchapter V, is not incorporated in § 348 (b). As a result, after converting to subchapter V proceedings, small business debtors are not eligible for the same “extension” to file a plan under § 1189 that § 348 (b) automatically grants under § 1121 (b) for debtors who convert to chapter 11. Instead, they find themselves immediately scrambling to file for an extension before the 90-day deadline lapses, if it has not already.13

Although the requirement for additional litigation to attain an extension is not an insurmountable death knell,14 at a minimum it frustrates Congress’s intent for a streamlined and cost-effective proceeding for qualified small businesses.15 This frustration is amplified by the fact that the additional litigation would be wholly unnecessary if a debtor had converted the case to a general, non-small-business-friendly chapter 11 proceeding, and so is only necessary due to Congress’s failure to amend § 348 (b) when codifying the SBRA.

How Courts Have Dealt with the Omission

Although only a handful of courts have issued opinions on a debtor’s request for extensions under § 1189 after converting to subchapter V, the disparate results of those courts underscore the urgency of the issue at hand.16 One court adopted a strict interpretation and held that debtors immediately placed themselves in default of § 1189 (b) when they elected to convert to subchapter V, claiming that “Congress purposefully set a short deadline for a debtor to file a plan” and “set a very high standard for an extension of that deadline.”17

Another court held that a “court may extend deadlines in § 1189 even after the periods have lapsed” when the need for the extension is “due to circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held accountable.”18 However, the judge in that case went on to deny the requested extension because numerous delays were “fully within the debtor’s control,” before offering limited consolation that his ruling was not fatal to the debtor’s case because “a late-filed plan [does not] doom a subchapter V case.”19

In another case, which cited both aforementioned cases, the court noted that no courts “have articulated any kind of step-by-step basis upon which to evaluate motions to convert filed after deadlines … have passed” before establishing its own “evaluative device.”20 Although the court’s analysis is coherent, metered and fair — and arguably debtor-friendly — its complex evaluation also provides the best possible illustration for understanding the necessity for Congress to amend § 348 (b) to incorporate §§ 1188 and 1189.21 The court started with an analysis of whether conversion was appropriate under § 1307 (d) — the chapter in which the debtor initially filed — before moving on to the question of whether conversion or immediate dismissal was proper in the new chapter under § 1112 (b).22

Before deciding on § 1112 (b), the court engaged in a circular analysis by first ensuring that the debtor did not run afoul of § 1189 to confirm that § 1112 (b) (4) (j) was not triggered.23 Next, after determining whether conversion was proper, the court finally engaged in evaluating the request for extension, but noted that the extension request must be made by a separate motion, and still left open the possibility that the extension request may be denied by the court for cause, fault or other bad faith.24

The Practical Effect of an Overly Complicated Judicial Analysis

Although the Keffer court provides an effective analysis that may offer the best option for courts evaluating these cases in the future, it should be noted that the resulting “evaluative device” is overly complex and inconsistent with the principles of judicial efficiency and consistency.25 In fact, some debtors might even hesitate to convert to the streamlined subchapter V proceeding designed specifically for them due to this uncertainty of outcome.26 Moreover, the litigious framework made necessary by the omission of subchapter V intent regarding subchapter V. While denial of a § 1189 extension following conversion might not be fatal to a debtor’s case per se, debtors are nonetheless required to litigate the same things multiple times, which results in additional filings, time and costs.27 This runs in direct contradiction to Congress’s noted intent for subchapter V to “permit qualifying small business debtors to file [for] bankruptcy in a timely, cost-effective manner.”28

Even the Keffer court noted that “it would have been helpful for Congress to [have provided] some guidance with respect to conversion from other bankruptcy chapters” before arriving at the conclusion that “it is up to the courts to interpret those laws” as best they can when unforeseen circumstances require debtors to convert their proceedings midstream.29 In Trepetin, the court noted that Congress expressed “significant concern for small business debtors, wanting to provide them with a realistic option for reorganizing and saving their business operations” that “balance [d] the … goals of speed and access.”30 Thus, it stands to reason that Congress did not intend the current result where debtors face the prospect of potential denial of conversion to subchapter V or, at best, the prohibitively expensive purgatory of additional litigation necessitated by compulsory extensions due to an unanticipated conversion.

The Recommendation

As the Keffer court noted, “[s] ubchapter V is a valuable tool for qualifying debtors and will facilitate reorganizations that were not possible before.”31 However, it is not a valuable tool for small business owners when a small oversight in the process of statutory amendment leaves them in a purgatory of uncertainty, time and cost. Therefore, consistent with congressional intent for the SBRA and in the interests of judicial efficiency, it is imperative that Congress amend § 348 (b) to incorporate the relevant sections from subchapter V conversion cases as they already do with all other chapter 11 conversions.

1 See Small Bus. Reorganization Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-54, 133 Stat. 1079.
2 In re Thurmon, 625 B.R. 417, 419 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2020).
3 In re Keffer, 628 B.R. 897, 905 (Bankr. S.D. W.Va. 2021) (quoting In re Seven Stars on the Hudson Corp., 618 B.R. 333, 339-40 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2020)).
4 Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 348 (b).
5 See generally Keffer, 628 B.R. 897; In re Seven Stars on the Hudson Corp., 618 B.R. 333; In re Trepetin, 617 B.R. 841 (Bankr. D. Md. 2020); In re Tibbens, No. 19-80964, 2021 WL 1087260 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Mar. 19, 2021). The court in each of these cases comes to its conclusion in a different manner.
6 It is difficult to know whether Congress’s failure to amend § 348 (b) was intentional or not, but circumstantial evidence indicates that it was most likely unintentional. First, § 348 was originally drafted in 1978 and last amended in 2010 (see Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2568; Pub. L. No. 111-327, 124 Stat. 3558), while the SBRA was not even drafted until 2019. Supra n.1. In addition, aside from § 348, the key language — “the order for relief under this chapter” — is only contained in 16 other sections. See §§ 701, 727, 923, 1102, 1110, 1121, 1141, 1188, 1189, 1192, 1201, 1221, 1228, 1301, 1305 and 1328. Of those 16 sections, 11 are incorporated into § 348 (b). Id.; see also § 348 (b). Of the five unincorporated sections, three of them are from the newly codified subchapter V. See §§ 1188, 1189 and 1192. This is noteworthy because all other chapter 11 sections using the key language are incorporated into § 348. See §§ 348 (b), 1102, 1110, 1121 and 1141. Thus, to find that Congress’s omission was intentional, one would have to assume that Congress intended to incorporate all other relevant chapter 11 sections but chose to exclude the relevant subchapter V sections. The more plausible explanation is that Congress simply failed to account for amending § 348 when it created subchapter V with the SBRA.
7 Supra n.5.
8 11 U.S.C. § 348 (f) (1) (A).
9 See 11 U.S.C. § 348 (b) (“Unless the court for cause orders otherwise, in sections 701 (a), 727 (a) (10), 727 (b), 1102 (a), 1110 (a) (1), 1121 (b), 1121 (c), 1141 (d) (4), 1201 (a), 1221, 1228 (a), 1301 (a), and 1305 (a) of this title, “the order for relief under this chapter” in a chapter to which a case has been converted under section 706, 1112, 1208, or 1307 of this title means the conversion of such case to such chapter.”).
10 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (b) (emphasis added).
11 11 U.S.C. § 348 (b).
12 Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1189.
13 See, e.g., In re Keffer, 628 B.R. at 899.
14 See In re Tibbens, 2021 WL 1087260, at *6 (stating that Congress did not intend to have late-filed plan doom subchapter V case).
15 Keffer, supra n.3.
16 Supra n.5.
17 In re Seven Stars on the Hudson Corp., 618 B.R. at 338-39, 345.
18 In re Tibbens, 2021 WL 1087260, at *8.
19 Id. at *6, *9.
20 In re Keffer, 628 B.R. at 909.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. Section 1112 (b) (4) (j) states that “failure to … file or confirm a plan, within the time fixed by this title,” is grounds for “cause” to dismiss under § 1112 (b) (1), thus a debtor requesting conversion after the expiration of the 90-day timeline to file a plan under § 1189 might automatically qualify for dismissal. However, the court reasoned that as long as the grounds for the requested extension are “attributable to circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held accountable” per § 1189, § 1112 (b) (4) (j) is not triggered, and conversion — rather than dismissal — is proper.
24 Id.; see also In re Tibbens, 2021 WL 1087260, at *9 (declining to extend deadlines, stating that numerous delays “occurred in the administration of the chapter 13 case that were fully within the debtor’s control and for which he should be held accountable”).
25 In re Keffer, 628 B.R. at 909; see also In re Seven Stars on the Hudson Corp., 618 B.R. 333; In re Trepetin, 617 B.R. 841; In re Tibbens, No. 19-80964, 2021 WL 1087260 (noting disparate analyses and outcomes in various jurisdictions).
26 Id.
27 In re Keffer, 628 B.R. at 909 (noting that Keffer court framework requires that appropriateness of conversion be evaluated under two different chapters and § 1189 be litigated at two different steps in framework, with second final, dispositive § 1189 analysis requiring separate motion).
28 Id. at 905 (quoting In re Seven Stars on the Hudson Corp., 618 B.R. at 339-40).
29 In re Keffer, 628 B.R. at 910; see also In re Tibbens, 2021 WL 1087260, at *4. In Keffer, the debtor did not know they could not file under chapter 13 until after the Internal Revenue Service processed their tax returns, while the debtor in Tibbens had to convert from chapter 13 because they discovered that they exceeded the debt limitations of chapter 13 cases after filing.
30 In re Trepetin, 617 B.R. at 846-47 (emphasis added).
31 In re Keffer, 628 B.R. at 910.

Tips For Preparing Your Practice For Sale

By: James D. Wall, Esq.

If you are contemplating a sale of your practice, you should thoughtfully consider the issues raised below. Selling a practice is in some respects like selling a house:  that is, you wouldn’t sell your house without first making sure the house presents well to potential buyers. The same is true for a professional practice.
 

Tip One:  Corporate Hygiene

You should review corporate charter documents to make sure you have conducted your business as originally authorized. Further, you should make sure that your practice is registered with the applicable licensing board. If there have been any internal changes of ownership, those should have been reported to the licensure board. You should also review your practice’s minutes to make sure those comply with state law.
 

Tip Two:  Employment Review

You should review (or have someone review) the employment agreements of all the providers and key employees of the practice. Can the employment agreements be assigned? If a contract is silent on assignability, then it is generally considered to be assignable. Does a “change of control” provision trigger an employee’s right to terminate the agreement. Further, you should review in employees’ contracts any restrictive covenants regarding competition. North Carolina courts have interpreted a transaction to trigger the commencement of the post-employment restrictive term. That is, if the covenant prohibits competition for one year after employment ends, some courts have concluded that the period commences to run as of the date of a transaction pursuant to which the employer is sold. You should also confirm that all of your licensed providers are current with respect to license renewals.
 

Tip Three:  Review of Third-Party Payor Agreements 

Many third-party payor agreements restrict assignment. Thus, it is highly unlikely that provider agreements would be assignable. Upon a transaction, providers often need to be recredentialed, which of course takes time. Some third-party payors require prior written notice to any type of change in ownership.
 

Tip Four:  Evaluate Third-Party Vendor Contracts 

The same type of analysis must be done with respect to third-party vendors. The contracts of primary concern are leases of your office space and equipment. These contracts typically do not allow assignment without permission from the lessor. If permission is required, that needs to be noted prior to sale so that the acquiring entity can continue with respect to office space and significant equipment. Institutional lessors often need quite a bit of time to agree to an assignment.
 

Tip Five:  Financial Information

You will want to meet with your accountant to make sure that you have financial reports up to date and in order for the previous three years. You should be able to explain any unusual peaks or valleys in profits, and any significant balance sheet items. If you received money as a result of the pandemic, you should have documents regarding your application for funds as well as the forgiveness of any loans due.
 

Tip Six:  Consider Type of Sale

You should also consider the ramifications of selling stock or assets. In our state, a medical practice must be owned by physicians (there are certain exceptions with respect to physicians owning practices with other health professionals, such as optometrists, psychologists, and APPs). Nonetheless, an unlicensed third party will not be able to purchase the stock of your practice.
 

A management services organization (referred to as an MSO) can purchase certain assets of your practice, but a licensee must own a medical practice. An MSO makes its money by managing the non-clinical affairs of the practice for a fee. The MSO often embraces a “friendly physician model” wherein the practice continues to be owned by a physician who would be “friendly” to the MSO and enter into a long-term management agreement with the MSO.
 

You need to discuss with your tax advisor the ramifications of an asset sale and a stock sale before you enter into a letter of intent with a prospective purchaser. Purchasers typically like to buy assets because this structure is more likely to extinguish prior claims against the practice. Sellers often favor sales of stock or membership interests because of favorable tax treatment.
 

Tip Seven:  Review Policies

Buyers active in the health care space will want to review significant policies of the practice in their due diligence. In this regard, you should make sure that HIPAA and other policies are up to date and are being followed. It is not uncommon for practices to have very well drafted policies, but very few in the practice know of their existence.
 

Tip Eight:  Fine-Tuning EBITDA

If you have a time horizon that will permit some planning, you will want to use that opportunity to maximize EBITDA. EBITDA is an acronym for “Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization.” Many transactions will be priced at a multiple of EBITDA. So, for every dollar that is created in EBITDA, purchase price will be increased by the multiple. For example, if the multiple is six times EBITDA, one dollar in EBITDA results in six dollars of purchase price. Typically, purchasers will look at a trailing 12 to 24 month calculation of EBITDA to determine purchase price. While these calculations routinely exclude extraordinary items, there may be opportunities within the practice to save money, thereby increasing purchase price. Also, in a professional practice, salaries of the owners are often normalized using national data, and then the excess is added to EBITDA. So, for example, if a doctor is making $350,000 in his or her own practice, and the national data suggests that earnings should be $280,000, the $70,000 is added back to earnings.
 

Tip Nine:  Be Ready to Commit Post-Sale Employment

The purchase price can be significantly affected by the sellers’ willingness to stay around post-sale as employees of the newly created enterprise. If you are willing to stick around, then that often creates a higher purchase price.
 

Tip Ten:  Tell the Truth

Resist the urge to puff beyond the boundaries of truthfulness. If you try to cover up termites with plywood, the buyer will find the termites in its due diligence, and all trust will be lost.

Bankruptcy: Your Friend During Tough Financial Times

By: Diana Santos Johnson

Typically, you do not think of bankruptcy as something that can empower and elevate individuals. However, as we enter 2023 with the nonstop news of record-breaking inflation and a possible recession, bankruptcy can be exactly this. During these times, it is important to remember that bankruptcy is a solution for some individuals struggling with their current finances.1

Bankruptcy exists to give the “honest but unfortunate debtor”2 a fresh start, but many are unaware of how bankruptcy can actually benefit individuals. This article will briefly explain how bankruptcy can assist individuals, what situations a bankruptcy filing will have the most impact on, and the qualities to look for in a bankruptcy attorney.

Chapters 7 and 13 Bankruptcies

There are several types of bankruptcies – Chapters 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15 – but the two that primarily assist individuals and married couples – referred to as “debtors” – are Chapter 7 and Chapter 13.

Chapter 7 bankruptcies are liquidation” bankruptcies and generally eliminate debt without a repayment plan. In this chapter,  a bankruptcy trustee is appointed to sell the debtor’s nonexempt assets and distribute the sale proceeds to creditors under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Code does allow the debtor to keep specific “exempt” property. This is the debtor’s real and personal property that is protected by state or federal law, such as equity in a home and vehicle, that the bankruptcy trustee cannot sell. If the exemption statutes do not protect property, the bankruptcy trustee will liquidate, or sell, the debtor’s remaining assets. In most Chapter 7 cases, all the debtor’s property will be protected, and the bankruptcy trustee cannot sell it. However, potential debtors should note that filing a petition under Chapter 7 may result in property loss. Unfortunately, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy is only available to those who pass the means test.3 The means test is a calculation that considers several factors, including your income, expenses, and family size, to determine whether you have enough disposable income to repay your debts. If your income is below the state median, you pass the means test and can move forward with a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. If you meet the filing requirements of Chapter 7, once your case is over, your debts will be discharged, or in other words, eliminated. If the debt is secured by collateral, such as a mortgage or car, you must continue to make payments to keep these items or release them in your Chapter 7.4

Chapter 13 bankruptcies are “wage earners” bankruptcies because you must have regular income to repay some of your debts. This chapter allows debtors to repay some or all their debts in a three-to-five-year period. Chapter 13 debtors present a plan on how they will repay their debts. Not all debts get repaid, and the amount of your plan payment depends on various factors, including the arrears on certain obligations and the value of the collateral. Payments are made monthly to a Chapter 13 Trustee who distributes payments to your creditors. At the end of your plan, you will be current on your mortgage and could have your vehicle paid off. Any unsecured debts like credit cards, personal loans, or medical bills not paid in full during the Chapter 13 plan will get discharged. A Chapter 13 plan also allows you to keep any property that may not be “exempt” by paying the equity into the Chapter 13 plan. You also do not have to pass a means test in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Instead, you will need to pay any additional income into your Chapter 13 plan payment if you have disposable income.5

Where Bankruptcy Can Make a Difference

Bankruptcy is not the solution to all financial problems but it can improve certain situations. If you encounter individuals with the following financial dilemmas, bankruptcy may be an option that can assist them:
 

  • Medical debt. A bankruptcy discharge usually eliminates medical debt. Despite the passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010, medical debt remains one of the top reasons that individuals file bankruptcy.6
  • Credit cards. A bankruptcy discharge typically eliminates credit card debt. Recent news suggests that Americans now carry more credit card debt because of higher prices due to inflation.7
  • Foreclosures. If you are facing a foreclosure of your home or even a rental property, a Chapter 13 bankruptcy can help you set up a payment plan to get current. Alternatively, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy can help you walk away from the home by eliminating any deficiencies you may owe.
  • Repossessions. If you are behind on your car payments or your car gets repossessed, bankruptcy can help you keep or retrieve your vehicle. A Chapter 13 bankruptcy will help you repay the amount you are behind on or even lower your payments, depending on how long you have owned the vehicle. If you no longer want to keep your car, a Chapter 7 can help eliminate any balance you may have owed on the car after it was sold at auction.
  • Temporary setbacks after a job loss. Many Americans live paycheck to paycheck, and a job loss will wreak havoc on personal finances. A Chapter 13 bankruptcy would allow debtors to repay mortgage payments, car payments, and other debts that may have gotten behind due to a job loss.
  • Civil lawsuits. Both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy stop civil actions from moving forward through the automatic stay. The automatic stay is an injunction that stops lawsuits, foreclosures, garnishments, and all collection activity against the debtor when a bankruptcy petition is filed.8
  • Wage Garnishments. Some states allow for wage garnishments based on civil judgments. A Chapter 7 or a Chapter 13 bankruptcy will stop the wage garnishment and allow you to keep your hard-earned income. While this list is not exclusive, these are typical situations where bankruptcy can be your friend. It is important to note that while bankruptcies have eliminated student loans in some instances, a bankruptcy filing will not typically discharge student loans.9

Finding the Right Bankruptcy Attorney

Bankruptcy is a specialized area of law (there are separate bankruptcy courthouses!), and it is vital to find a knowledgeable attorney if you are considering filing bankruptcy. One of the keys to being comfortable filing bankruptcy is finding an attorney who thoroughly explains the eligibility requirements and the entire bankruptcy process to you. Look for attorneys who personally handle the consultations, especially the initial consultation.

You also want to ensure that your attorney answers all your questions about the bankruptcy process. For many, speaking with a bankruptcy attorney is the first time individuals honestly assess their entire financial picture. You want to know that the attorney is answering your questions and giving you the information you need to decide if bankruptcy is the right step for you. Many individuals are concerned about how their credit will be impacted by filing bankruptcy. An effective bankruptcy counsel will not only take this concern seriously and address the potential consequences of filing bankruptcy but can also explain what happens to your debts and your credit if you do not file bankruptcy.

Bankruptcy attorneys typically advertise their services on television or the radio. Still, another way to find a bankruptcy attorney is to talk to family members and friends who have filed bankruptcy. Ask them if they were satisfied with their bankruptcy attorney andexperience. Often, the best bankruptcy attorneys do not advertise and find new clients solely through word of mouth.

Bankruptcy exists to give individuals a fresh start. With the proper knowledge and understanding of how bankruptcy works, bankruptcy can become your friend and empower individuals to overcome their financial problems in 2023.

1 Filing bankruptcy is a decision that is made on a case-by-case basis, and this article is not intended for legal advice. If you are considering bankruptcy, please meet with a qualified bankruptcy attorney who can assist you in making this determination.
2 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1112.07[3] (citation omitted).
3 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1)-(2).
4 This is an overview of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The complete statutory requirements of Chapter 7 bankruptcies can be found at 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-784.
5 This is an overview of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The complete statutory requirements of Chapter 13 bankruptcies can be found at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330.
6 Kimberly Amadeo, “Medical Bankruptcy and the Economy,” The Balance (January 20, 2022).
7 “Americans are piling up credit card debt — and it could prove very costly,” NPR (January 11, 2023).
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 362.
9 See NCLC Publication, New Process to Discharge Student Loans in Bankruptcy, which describes Guidance issued by the Department of Justice on how bankruptcy debtors can obtain discharges of their student loans using a ten-step process. John Rao, New Process to Discharge Student Loans in Bankruptcy, NCLC (December 12, 2022).

Can They Really Do That? FTC Proposes Ban of Noncompetes.

By: James D. Wall, Esq.

As has been widely reported, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently proposed a new rule that would prohibit employers from imposing noncompetes on their workers. This ban would materially and dramatically affect the healthcare industry, especially in North Carolina, where noncompetes are generally enforceable. Many providers have executed employment agreements that contain restrictions on competition with their employers. Additionally, the FTC estimates that approximately 30 million workers have agreed to a noncompete.

Purposes for the Proposed Rule.

The FTC’s chair, Lina M. Kahn, stated when releasing the proposed rule that the freedom to change jobs “is clear to economic liberty and to a competitive, thriving economy.” The FTC has indicated that the noncompetes prevent workers from switching jobs freely and deprives them of higher wages and better working conditions. Interestingly, the FTC specifically pointed out the burden on “doctors” (among others) in its release announcing the proposed ban. The FTC estimated that banning noncompetes would increase workers’ earnings by nearly $300 billion, save consumers up to $148 billion on health costs each year and double the number of companies in the same industry that would be founded by a former worker. The FTC also estimates that 18% of US workers are covered by noncompetes. Anecdotally, with respect to healthcare workers in this State, it would seem that the number would exceed 90%.  Our office has drafted and reviewed hundreds of provider employment agreements, and well over 90% of those agreements contain restrictions on competition.

In some states, noncompetes are disallowed. In North Carolina, noncompetes are permitted and enforced if they meet certain criteria. They must be in writing, protect a legitimate business interest of the employer, be reasonable as to activity restricted, and not be against public policy. Often, physicians who are contemplating leaving their existing employer are faced with the choice of moving their families, taking temporary locums jobs outside the geographic scope of the noncompete, staying with their existing employer, or hiring an attorney to fight the noncompete. Some physicians find none of these options appealing.

What the Rule Prohibits.

The FTC’s proposed rule would prohibit employers from using noncompete clauses with limited exceptions. That is, employers could not:
 

  • enter into or attempt to enter into a noncompete with a worker;
  • maintain a noncompete with a worker; or
  • represent to a worker, under certain circumstances, that the worker is subject to a noncompete.


The proposed rule would apply to independent contractors as well as employees and would require employers to rescind existing noncompetes and affirmatively inform workers that they are no longer in effect. This, of course, could create chaos in the healthcare industry in our State, where many providers are employed by health systems and large providers who often exact restrictive covenants from their employees. Would physicians bound by restrictive covenants flee their employers? The ban on noncompetes would not extend to other similar types of employer restrictions like nondisclosure agreements.

Statutory Predicate for the Ban.

The FTC cannot pass legislation; only Congress can do that. The FTC, however, can implement existing legislation when Congress has given it rule-making authority. The FTC is relying on Section 5 of the FTC Act, which bans unfair methods of competition. The FTC has pointed out that its current proposed ban is not unprecedented. It has taken action against a Michigan based security guard company and its key executives for using coercive noncompetes with respect to low wage employees. The FTC has also recently ordered two of the largest US glass container manufacturers to stop imposing noncompetes on their workers because they obstruct competition and impede new companies from hiring.

Inevitable Challenges.

As could be expected, organizations that tend to side with the causes of employers have not so subtly hinted that the FTC is overstepping its bounds. The US Chamber of Commerce, for example, has indicated that it plans to take the FTC to court over its proposed rule. The Chamber CEO has stated in a Wall Street Journal op-ed that the Chamber will oppose the proposed regulation “with all tools at our disposal, including litigation.” The Chamber and other groups have indicated that allowing the FTC to vitiate provisions in hundreds of thousands of contracts is effectively diving down a steep, slippery slope that would have no contractual provision off limits to the FTC. These opponents also assert that there is a long history of regulation of noncompetes at the State level. That is, each State legislature decides what is best for its citizens.

What’s Next?

When the FTC proposes a rule, it allows the public to comment on the proposed rule. (If you doubt the impact of noncompetes on the healthcare industry, I would suggest that you spend fifteen minutes reading the public comments, many of which are from providers who feel trapped in jobs they believe they cannot leave). After the comment period expires, the FTC will decide whether to adopt the rule. If it adopts the rule, there will inevitably be litigation, and it is hard to imagine that litigation stopping short of a trip to the US Supreme Court.

Even if the rule is not adopted or is successfully challenged, this exercise has brought noncompetes to the front burner. Both parties have draft bills in Congress addressing noncompetes. If the rule is not passed, one would anticipate other avenues to curtail the use of noncompetes either by congressional action or, with respect to healthcare, some other agency prohibiting noncompetes to participate in government contracting or government programs.

Some Doctors Fed Up With MSO Model

By: James D. Wall, Esq.

As shrinking reimbursement and heightened regulation force doctors to join hospital systems or practices managed by management services organizations (MSOs), some doctors are pushing back. A recent California lawsuit filed by a group of physicians against an MSO may be the canary in the coal mine.

The MSO Model

California, like about three dozen other states including North Carolina, has prohibitions restricting the corporate practice of medicine (CPOM). These states prohibit lay corporations from owning medical practices. There is a popular model that “works around” these prohibitions. MSOs often become affiliated with medical practice through a management services agreement (MSA). The MSA typically provides that the MSO will provide all administrative and non-clinical support needed by the medical practice in exchange for a significant fee. On its face, this has appeal: let the physicians practice medicine and leave the administrative headaches to someone else. In this model, the medical practice is often owned by a “friendly physician,” who is called friendly because of the physician’s ties to the MSO. The MSA will acknowledge that the medical practice has control over all matters clinical. The MSO controls everything else. Since the MSO is not a medical practice, it can be owned by private equity or any other lay investors.

The California Lawsuit

In the California suit (American Academy of Emergency Medicine Physician Group, Inc. v. Envision Healthcare Corporation, et al), a company that provides administrative and business services to physician groups has alleged that an MSO has violated the California restrictions on the corporation practice of medicine. While the corporate practice of medicine is a creature of state law and this suit would affect those in California, one could argue that the MSO model itself is at issue.

In the lawsuit, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant MSO used various entities that “exist only on paper” to undertake functions the law permits only physicians to undertake, such as employing physicians or providing medical coverage for hospitals. It further alleges that the MSO possesses the direct and indirect power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of the professional corporations which is contrary to law.

The plaintiff also alleges that MSO uses “friendly physicians” to control hundreds if not thousands of medical groups. Plaintiff also alleges that the MSO installs executives or officers in the professional medical corporations who are bound by side agreements to sell the entities to the MSO if requested for nominal amounts. The plaintiff alleges that the bylaws of these professional entities prevent the removal of the MSO officers as officers or directors of the medical practice. The plaintiff also alleges that the MSO ensures corporate control of the professional entities by requiring the physicians’ owners to execute agreements limiting their authority. These restrictions include a restriction on the issuance of dividends, the creation of additional stock, the selling of the medical group, or the transfer of shares. The plaintiff has alleged that there are other indicia of MSO control including the MSO negotiating third party payor contracts and deciding whether the medical practice can enter into such contracts, the MSO determining fees to be charged patients, the MSO making coding decisions, and the MSO keeping all revenues after physician salaries are paid. Given these indicia of ownership, the plaintiff argues that the MSO is the functional owner of the medical practices.

So What?

Even if the allegations in the Complaint are proven true, one could ask “so what?” That is, if state law requires a professional practice to be owned by licensed professionals, that requirement appears to have been met. Further, if state law does not restrict the types of board members, then a professional corporation can appoint lay directors. The “so what?” equivalent in litigation is a motion to dismiss. In this case, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied.

Friends of the Court

What is also interesting in this California case is that two organizations have filed for permission to submit Amicus Curiae briefs (amicus curiae means “friend of the court” and is used when a non-party has a strong interest in the matter and wants to influence the outcome). The American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP), which states that it is the nation’s largest nonprofit professional association focused on furthering the professional development of emergency physicians, requested and received permission to file a brief in the matter. It argues in support of plaintiff: “ACEP firmly believes that medical decisions must be made by physicians and opposes any practice structure that threatens physician autonomy, the patient-physician relationship, or the ability of the physician to place the needs of patients over profits.” It further asserts that medical practices, not lay companies, should control (i) a patient’s medical records, (ii) hiring and firing of physicians and allied health staff, (iii) decisions regarding coding, and (iv) approving the selection of medical equipment and supplies.

Additionally, the California Medical Association (CMA) requested and received permission to file a brief in the matter. CMA describes itself as having served as “the voice of California’s house of medicine to advocate for the medical professional against intrusions and transgressions…” CMA further states in its motion that “it springs from a fundamental public policy to protect and preserve the independence of physicians’ professional judgment in the care of their patients, free from external forces that can interfere with the physician-patient relationship.” Both advocacy groups have filed briefs supporting the plaintiff.

Canary in the Coal Mine or Anomaly?

This case may signal the next wave of lawsuits by physician advocacy groups against MSOs. What is interesting about this case is that the manner in which many MSOs do business is under attack. That is, the plaintiff complains that the MSO is exercising undue control over professional entities even though the underlying documents may satisfy the mandates of state law. Further, it is eyebrow raising that the plaintiffs in this case did not request monetary damages; they merely requested that the court enjoin the MSO from continuing to act as it had been acting. The trial date is set for early 2024. Because of the lack of a request for monetary damages, and the suit challenges the way of doing business for many MSOs, it would seem the likelihood of settlement would be remote.

NC Medical Board Proposes Position Statement on Licensee Employment With Hospitals, Group Practices and Other Health Systems

By: James D. Wall, Esq.

The North Carolina Medical Board recently proposed a Position Statement on physician employment with hospitals and other large groups.  A Position Statement is not a law or regulation, but rather the Medical Board’s interpretation of existing laws or regulations that govern the practice of physicians, physician assistants and nurse practitioners.  Position Statements give practitioners a road map for compliant and ethical practice.  One would disregard a Position Statement at his or her peril.

What’s the Problem?

While the Board is clear to state that the existence of a Position Statement should not be taken as an indication of the Board’s enforcement policies, it only stands to reason that the Board would have, or anticipates having, some concerns about the “shift from licensees practicing in personally owned practices toward licensees practicing while subject to employment and other contractual relationships with hospitals, group practices and other health systems.”  (Proposed Position Statement 9.1.3., Licensee Employment, p.1).

Know The Structure

The Board expects licensees to know the organizational structure of the employer.  I don’t think this means a physician must memorize the org chart of a multi-billion dollar system.  I believe this advice is more elementary.  Physicians are sometimes employed by start-ups or practices that have  relationships with management service organizations (MSOs), and they often conflate the MSO with the managed practice.  With few exceptions, physicians cannot be employed by a lay corporation to deliver professional services on behalf of that lay corporation.  Physicians may, however, be employed by licensed hospitals and HMOs.  With the increase of MSOs, it is important for physicians to know that the MSOs cannot employ physicians to render professional services.  The licensee’s employment agreement should be with the medical practice, and the remuneration should be paid by the medical practice.  The physician should know the difference between the practice and the MSO, and keep the line between the two clear and in focus.

Employment Agreements Are Real

The employment agreement should be consistent with the employment relationship.  The Board provides in the proposed Position Statement, “Employment Agreements are legal documents. Licensees should seek their own legal counsel before signing them.”  The Position Statement also provides that employment agreements should be negotiated in “good faith” and that both parties should engage legal counsel “experienced in physician employment matters.”  It is obvious that I would mention this, analogous to the barber extolling the virtues of a haircut; but I think it is telling us more.  The takeaway to licensees is “do not tell us you did not know what was in your employment agreement, or that you did not understand it.”  Physicians are forewarned.

Know What is Expected of You

Physicians are required to know the policies and protocols of their employers.  The Board will have little tolerance for a physician’s attempt to defend his or her actions because an employer steered the physician away from doing the right thing.  Further, ancillary to this point is the Board expects physicians to associate with ethical employers.  A physician cannot hide behind an employer when taken to task.  In fact, the Position Statement goes so far to say that you need to “Recognize that your obligation to provide care that conforms to the standards of acceptable and prevailing medical practice, or the ethics of the medical profession, may require you to leave a situation that does not allow you to provide such care.”  This is the “Johnny Paycheck[1] option.”  In short, if your employer is making you do something you believe to be short of acceptable and prevailing standards of medical care, the Board expects you to resign.

A Supervisory Role Doesn’t Insulate You

The Position Statement is specific: if your position removes you from direct patient care “such as a medical director or vice president of medical affairs . . . [such a role] does not remove you from professional ethical obligations.”  The Board provides that “patient welfare must take priority in any situation where the interests of licensees and employers conflict.”

Guidance to Employers Is Plentiful

The proposed Position Statement cites the American Medical Association’s “Principles for Physician Employment” AMA H-22.950 which indicates that employed physicians “should be free to exercise their personal and professional judgment in voting, speaking and advocating on any manner regarding patient care interests, the profession, health care in the community and the independent exercise of medical judgment.  Employed physicians should not be deemed in breach of their employment agreements, nor be retaliated against by their employers, for asserting these interests.”

Further, the Position Statement indicates that while physicians typically assign billings to employers, “employed physicians or their chosen representatives should be prospectively involved if the employer negotiates agreements for them for professional fees, capitation or global billing, or shared savings.  Additionally, employed physicians should be informed about the actual payment amount allocated to the professional fee component of the total payment received by the contractual arrangement.”  Position Statement, p. 5.

Conclusion – Patient Welfare is the Guidepost

The Position Statement is replete with references to patient welfare trumping the relationship between the employed physician and his or her employer.  For example, patients should be notified when a physician departs from the practice, and informed of the physician’s new contact information.  Further, the Position Statement cites the AMA “A physician’s paramount responsibility is to his or her patients.”  The AMA recognizes the inherent conflict of interest with the physician’s duty to his or her patients and the duty of loyalty owed to the physician’s employer.  “This divided loyalty can create conflicts of interest, such as financial incentives to over- or under-treat patients, which employed physicians should strive to recognize and address.”  It is clear, however, that the “employer-made-me-do-it” will not be an acceptable defense.

[1] Johnny Paycheck was a popular country music singer in the 70’s whose biggest hit was “Take This Job and Shove It,” a working man’s anthem at the time written by David Allen Coe.

A Pro Bono Experience: Assisting First Church of God in Christ in Stopping the Foreclosure of Their Church 

By: Diana Santos Johnson

First Church of God in Christ is a thriving church in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. They have owned their worship space property – which contains a building valued at almost $1 million – for 23 years. Like most commercial real estate owners, First Church had a five-year term on the loan that was secured by their church property. When the term ended in February 2022, the lender was not willing to work with First Church to extend the term or give them additional time to refinance the loan, despite having an excellent payment history and substantial equity in the property.
 

Within a few months of the term due date, the lender filed a foreclosure action in Forsyth County.  First Church initially contacted Waldrep Wall Babcock & Bailey PLLC to explore the possibility of filing bankruptcy to stop the foreclosure action. After determining that bankruptcy would not be the right fit in this situation and would be too costly, attorneys Jennifer Lyday and Diana Johnson, along with the Waldrep Wall Babcock & Bailey PLLC bankruptcy team, decided to assist the church pro bono – without a charge – to delay the foreclosure action long enough for First Church to find another lender to refinance the loan.
 

Waldrep Wall Babcock & Bailey PLLC attorneys also assisted First Church in submitting documents to the new lender and in explaining the new loan terms. Eventually, First Church was able to secure a ten-year term with a new lender and was able to obtain additional funds to replace their existing air conditioning units.
 

Waldrep Wall Babcock & Bailey PLLC also coordinated with attorney Patti Dobbins, of Patti D Dobbins Attorney at Law, PLLC, to do the refinance loan closing pro bono. Attorney Dobbins coordinated a closing date that was flexible for the First Church board, prepared the necessary closing documents, and filed all the necessary paperwork to complete the refinance.  First Church was able to close on the new loan on August 25, 2022. After the new loan closed, the foreclosure action was dismissed, and First Church was no longer at risk of losing their church home of over 20 years. First Church Pastor Bernie Cundiff stated, “Jennifer, Diana, and the team at Waldrep Wall Babcock & Bailey PLLC went the extra mile for us. They helped us every step of the way with excellence, and it was truly ‘The Hand of the Lord’!”
 

Lisa Lash, First Church Secretary, stated, “We have been extremely blessed to have worked with such an extraordinary team! Jennifer and Diana were truly engaged in every phase of the process. Equipped with all the knowledge necessary to complete a case such as ours, they guided us with professionalism and confidence – always there to support us with an eagerness to see us succeed. We will forever be grateful for their diligence, work ethic, and their sincere compassion for our church.”
 

Pro Bono Initiatives at Waldrep Wall Babcock & Bailey PLLC

Waldrep Wall Babcock & Bailey PLLC is committed to serving the most vulnerable in our society with legal, social, and economic issues through pro bono service. The firm regularly provides pro bono representation to individuals and non-profit entities in need. The firm’s attorneys look for opportunities to use their education and experience to be of service to their fellow North Carolinians and take to heart their professional obligations as lawyers to make a difference.
 

About Waldrep Wall Babcock & Bailey PLLC

Attorneys at Waldrep Wall Babcock & Bailey PLLC are experienced in assisting commercial property owners avoid foreclosure, and our team can guide you to the best possible resolution of your business’ financial problems.
 

Waldrep Wall Babcock & Bailey PLLC is a business law firm focused on bankruptcy, commercial transactions, healthcare, commercial real estate, litigation, mediation, education law, and municipal law. Through our highly experienced attorneys, we serve clients with efficiency and expertise, both inside and outside of the courtroom.
 

Our firm employs a different approach – one that is client-centric and encourages a collaborative team culture that is data driven, tech-enabled, and multidisciplinary. We focus on offering solutions to our clients, which involves selecting the right attorneys in our firm to guide your specific business and legal needs. With Waldrep Wall Babcock & Bailey PLLC, you don’t just hire an attorney, you engage the expertise of our entire firm.

Selling Your Practice? Consider These Issues First

There has been a resurgence of practice acquisitions of late. If you are an owner in your practice, chances are you are considering selling your practice or soon will be. Other than purchase price, which is the bait on the hook, what else should you consider?

Who’s Your Buyer?

In general, there are three types of buyers. First, there are hospital buyers. With few exceptions, our recent experience has been that hospitals pay practices the fair market value of tangible assets. Often, the “value” is achieved by more lucrative employment agreements as a result of the hospital system’s reimbursement rates that are more favorable than what a private practice might negotiate. There is not a lot of money transferred at closing.

The second types of buyers are other practices. Often, acquirers have built an efficient practice, and believe that they can squeeze inefficiencies out of smaller practices and make them more profitable. These acquirers usually have methods and processes that, when shared, make the acquired practice more profitable and thus more valuable.

These acquirers may have a long range plan of building a bigger practice, which would make them more valuable to the third type of buyer, private equity backed management service organizations, or “MSOs”. While some MSOs are not backed by private equity, we will assume for the purposes of this discussion, that they are. This type of transaction involves the MSO purchasing the non-clinical assets of a practice, including goodwill. The practice owners often sell their ownership in the practice to a physician who may be “friendly” with the MSO. The friendly physician, simultaneous with the closing, causes to enter into a long term management services agreement (MSA) with the MSO. These types of transactions have become popular among practices because, well, adult money changes hands at closing. The MSO receives a return on its investment through the fees paid under the MSA. Often, these fees are paid from the reduced compensation of the providers in the practice. Further, in many of these transactions, owners in the practice are required to “roll-over” purchase price into the MSO as an investment.

What Is Your Timing?

Often, timing can dictate the type of purchaser whom you pursue. We have helped smaller practices whose founder has experienced health issues and must transition his or her practice on a short time frame. Founders often do this to transition loyal employees and to address the nightmarish administrative burden of administering patient charts of a closed practice. In those cases, hospitals or other practices may be a better fit because there is often a prior working relationship between the buyer and seller.

Donating Your Practice

Another exit strategy is for the founding physician to donate his or her practice to a non-profit hospital. With some significant caveats, a physician may be able to deduct as a charitable contribution the appraised value of his or her practice. This allows the physician to meet his or her transition goals with respect to employees and patient charts, while at the same time giving him or her significant tax advantages that may outweigh mere liquidation value of the practice.

What Are Your Goals?

If you have plenty of time to search for a buyer, then your goal is to obtain the most value for your practice. This is not only a function of purchase price, but also depends on the tax treatment of the consideration you receive. For example, if your practice is a C corporation and you sell assets, the corporation will pay tax on the gain resulting from the sale, and the C corporation’s shareholders will pay tax on the dividend they receive as a result of the sale. C corporation dividends are not deductible by the C corporation.  As a result, this phenomenon is often referred to as a “double tax” since the C corporation pays tax on the gain and the shareholders pay tax on the resulting dividend.

The goal should be to structure the transaction so that there is no double tax, that the proceeds received by the owners are taxed at what have been lower capital gains rates, and that the tax on any roll-over equity be deferred until that roll-over equity is liquidated. This is often easier said than done.

Second Bites of the Apple

As a general rule, if practices sell to private equity, they are often valued based on a multiple of “EBITDA,” which is “earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization.” Also, as a general rule, larger practices can often command a higher multiple of EBITDA than a comparably run smaller practice. One way to think of this is that one practice with 100 providers would be more valuable than the sum of the value of 50 practices with two providers each. This matters because with practice and MSO acquirers, the selling physicians may be asked to roll-over equity into the new enterprise. The goal of course is that the new enterprise will grow and prosper, and the rolled over equity will create another liquidity event for the physicians.

Not as Easy as It Looks

The complexity of a sale is often dictated by the type of buyer. In a hospital transaction, there is usually an asset purchase agreement and employment agreements for the providers. Since hospitals are exempt from the prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine, they can either directly employ the acquired physician, or own an operating LLC that does so. Further, an acquiring practice can directly employ the acquired physicians. The rub comes when lay companies like MSOs are purchasing non-clinical assets. Because MSOs cannot own medical practices, the transactions involving their relationships with medical practices are often fraught with peril. In short, don’t try this at home.